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PROPOSAL FOR A NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER ON
ASSASSINATION
Jeffrey F. Addicott *
I. INTRODUCTION
"The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and
apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals
nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets,
the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the di-
plomacy of the cannon and machine-gun."
al-Qaida Training Manual'
With the passing of the first anniversary of the terrorist2 at-
tacks on America,3 the United States is well on its way to winning
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ginia School of Law; S.J.D., 1994, University of Virginia School of Law. The author wishes
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supported this article with outstanding research and supurb insight.
1. THE AL-QAIDA MANUAL 8, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingman-
ual.htm (last updated Oct. 8, 2002).
2. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The USA Patriot
Act provides definitions for "terrorist organization," "domestic terrorism," and "interna-
tional terrorism." Id. § 411. A terrorist organization is defined as one that is (1) designated
by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization under the process established under
current law; (2) designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization for immi-
gration purposes; or (3) a group of two or more individuals that commits terrorist activities
or plans or prepares to commit (including locating targets for) terrorist activities. Id. §
411(a)(1)(A)(i).
3. On September 11, 2001, a total of nineteen members of the terrorist al-Qaida net-
work hijacked four domestic United States passenger jet aircraft while in flight (five ter-
rorists in three of the planes and four in the fourth). The terrorists crashed two of the air-
craft into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York. A third plane crashed
into the Pentagon, but the fourth plane was forced down by passengers into a field in
Pennsylvania. According to a New York Times tally, approximately 3,067 were killed (not
including the nineteen terrorists) along with billions of dollars in property loss. Dead and
Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at A12. This figure includes 184 dead at the Pentagon
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the War on Terror.4 Contrary to the hopes of the al-Qaida terror-
ist network,5 the unprovoked attacks did not ignite a general up-
rising in the Arab world, either against the West 6 or against those
countries considered as moderate Islamic regimes. In fact, just
the opposite has occurred. Not only has there not been a general
Muslimjihad against the United States or other Western nations,
not a single moderate Arab or Islamic government has been top-
pled by the machinations of the militant Islamic terrorists. In
fact, Afghanistan's dictatorial Taliban,7 which provided open sup-
port to the al-Qaida terrorist network, has been defeated in toto
on the battlefield and swept into the dust bin of history. Fur-
thermore, in tandem with the destruction of the Taliban, the al-
Qaida terrorist network has been significantly weakened and
forced into hiding.' Only a handful of totalitarian States dare to
provide them any backing or assistance.9
(counting the fifty-nine passengers and flight crew on the hijacked plane) and forty dead in
Pennsylvania. Id.
4. See generally JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR (2003) (argu-
ing that the War on Terror requires both a military solution in the short term, as well as
the long-term solution of promoting normative democratic values-encapsulated in first
and second-generation human rights-throughout the community of nations).
5. The al-Qaida terrorist organization, founded in 1989 by Saudi Arabian Osama bin
Laden, has been referred to by some as a "virtual state"-having all of the attributes of a
nation-state except for a fixed geographic location. See Philip Bobbitt, Get Ready for the
Next Long War, TIME, Sept. 11, 2002, at 84 ("A1-Qaeda... represents a new and pro-
foundly dangerous kind of organization ... [it] has many of the characteristics of other
states ... but is borderless; it declares wars, makes allegiances with other states and is
global in scope but lacks a definable location on the map.").
6. The term "West" or "Western" refers to the peoples and cultures of Europe and the
Western Hemisphere.
7. For almost a decade, the al-Qaida terrorist organization headed by bin Laden op-
erated openly in Afghanistan with the complete support of the Pashtun-dominated Tali-
ban government. See Killing for the Glory of God, in a Land Far from Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2001, at Al. The relationship between the Taliban and the al-Qaida terrorist or-
ganization provided a seminal example of state-supported terrorism. See id. Afghanistan
became a terror training ground for thousands of Arab and non-Arab al-Qaida militants
including Kashmiris, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and others (including some Americans).
See David Rohde & C.J. Chivers, Qaeda's Grocery Lists and Manuals of Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at Al. The camps produced individuals and cells of well-trained ter-
rorists who infiltrated numerous countries to both recruit additional members and carry-
out terrorist attacks. See Philip Shenon & David Johnston, In Terror Search, F.B.I. Tracks
Hundreds in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at Al.
8. But see Don Van Natta Jr. & David Johnston, In Latest Strikes, Officials See Signs
of Revived Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at Al. The article focuses on the fear that al-
Qaida has reconstituted itself into smaller cells and cites a recent tape by Ayman al-
Zawahiri (bin Laden's closest lieutenant) threatening continued "attacks on 'America and
it allies."' Id. Senator Richard C. Shelby of Alabama is quoted as saying, "'We always
warned that there would be more attacks because we have not finished off the Al Qaeda
[Vol. 37:751
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In prosecuting the War on Terror,1 ° the United States of Amer-
ica has been confronted with a myriad of issues concerning how
best to deal with the new threat of al-Qaida-styled terrorism and
those rogue nations that support terrorism.11 As the leading de-
mocracy and only remaining superpower in the world, these con-
cerns are rubricated by a strong desire to follow the rule of law,12
both in terms of homeland defense and the use of military force in
international settings.
From a domestic perspective, the continuing dilemma for de-
mocratic policymakers is how best to protect the nation, without
curtailing long-recognized civil liberties. 3 From an international
perspective, American policymakers are likewise concerned with
adhering to international laws14 associated with both the lawful-
group. We've disrupted it. We've had them on the run, but they are still around.'" Id.
9. President Bush has forcefully argued that Iraq under Saddam Hussein provided
support to al-Qaida. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, The War on Terror Points a Country To-
ward Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at A4.
10. The term "War on Terror" is commonly used to describe the ongoing conflict be-
tween the United States and the al-Qaida terror network. See, e.g., id. Nevertheless, the
Bush Administration has repeatedly indicated that the War on Terror also includes those
rogue states who pose a threat to the United States with the possession or desired posses-
sion of weapons of mass destruction. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 29, 2002) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
01/20020129-11.html [hereinafter State of the Union Address] ("The United States of
America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the
world's most destructive weapons."); see also David E. Sanger, Sends a Warning: In
Speech, He Calls Iraq, Iran and North Korea "an Axis of Evil," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002,
at Al.
11. See Erica Goode, A Day of Terror: The Psychology; Attackers Believed to Be Sane,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A13 (discussing terrorism in other nations).
12. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines "rule of law" as
"a substantive legal principle" and "[t]he doctrine that every person is subject to the ordi-
nary law within the jurisdiction." Id.
13. See id. at 239. The term "civil liberty" is most commonly associated with the provi-
sions set forth in the Bill of Rights. Black's Law Dictionary defines "civil liberties" as
"[fireedom from undue governmental interference or restraint," as measured against indi-
vidual liberties set out in the Constitution. See id.
14. The rule of law in international law refers to both that body of law reflected in ap-
plicable treaty obligations and in "customary international law." See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987). Customary
international law comes from observing past uniformities among nations of a norm or
standard that has reached widespread acceptance in the international community. See id.
§ 102 cmt. b. Evidence of customary international law may be found in judicial decisions,
the writing of noted jurists, diplomatic correspondence, and other evidence concerning the
practice of states. See id. § 103. For example, certain categories of human rights, i.e., so-
called "first generation human rights," are binding on all nation-states regardless of
whether a particular State has entered into a specific treaty. See id. § 324 cmt. e.
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ness of the use of force1" and the appropriate application of that
force.16 Without question, the most pressing issue in the interna-
tional realm centers on the Bush Administration's promotion of a
legal rationale for the preemptive use of military force against al-
Qaida-styled terrorists or rogue states who pose a direct or gath-
ering threat to the United States"v by means of weapons of mass
destruction ("WMD").18
Juxtaposed to the issue of crafting a legal basis for the use of
preemptive military force is the recurring issue of whether cer-
tain individuals-such as high level al-Qaida officials or leaders
of totalitarian states which support or sponsor terrorism-can be
legally targeted for "assassination." In other words, if preemptive
military force is an acceptable addition to the rule of law, can the
United States simply kill selected high-level leaders without hav-
ing to employ large-scale military forces against the offending
rogue nation or terrorist organization?
There are two principle documents associated with these con-
cerns. Respectively, they are the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America ("National Security Strategy") released
by the White House on September 17, 200219 and Executive Order
12,333 banning assassination.
20
The purpose of this article is to provide a policy and legal
analysis of the U.S. position regarding assassination, as viewed in
the context of the lawful use of preemptive military force. In do-
ing so, the article examines the deficiencies of the current Execu-
tive Order 12,333 and suggests that it should be replaced by a
new executive order which clearly defines the circumstances un-
der which individuals may be lawfully targeted for death by mili-
tary forces-either in peacetime or war. Alternatively, if a new
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13-16
(Sept. 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY1, auailable at www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
18. See 50 U.S.C. § 2302(1) (2000). A "weapon of mass destruction" is defined as "any
weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemation, or impact of -
(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radia-
tion or radioactivity." Id.
19. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 17.
20. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
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and more precise executive order is not issued to replace Execu-
tive Order 12,333, this article suggests that there are two inter-
locking principles that militate against overturning Executive
Order 12,333. The first of these reasons regards properly inter-
preting the most common definition of assassination; the second
considers the proper use of armed force under the rule of law.
Taken together, this article concludes that those who advocate
that the ban on assassination should be lifted without modifica-
tion are essentially advocating that the United States should be
able to engage in unlawful killing, or murder.
II. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,333
"We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involv-
ing the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965."
Church Committee Report
21
In the days following the September 11 attacks on the United
States, the question of retaliation and self-preservation weighed
heavily on the minds of policymakers. Instinctively, many in
Washington called for an immediate response to the perpetrators
behind the attacks, even if it meant engaging in assassination,
which some clearly viewed to be in violation of the longstanding
Executive Order 12,333 prohibiting assassination by agents of the
United States government.2 Indeed, as the War on Terror pro-
ceeds, a similar attitude is now widely expressed concerning the
matter of toppling the dictator Saddam Hussein by simply killing
him.23 These views represent a misunderstanding of Executive
Order 12,333 and the legal basis for responding to aggression.
21. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. NO. 94-465,
at 71 (1975) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT].
22. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. at 200; David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein,
Some Call for Lifting of Assassination Ban, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A24 (stating
that in the days following the attack, some lawmakers called for a repeal of the ban).
23. See Fleisher Backs Hussein's Slaying: "One Bullet" Less Costly Than War, Bush
Spokesman Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2002, at A12 [hereinafter Fleisher Backs Hussein's
Slaying] (stating that an Iraqi assassination of Saddam Hussein would be "welcome").
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A. Historical Background for Presidential Executive Order 12,333
The genesis of Executive Order 12,333 can be traced back to
1976, when President Gerald Ford issued the first executive order
prohibiting political assassination.24  President Ford was
prompted to act by a 1975 Congressional Commission (commonly
known as the Church Committee) headed by Senator Frank
Church, which held hearings on the question of whether the
United States had engaged in assassination or assassination plots
against certain foreign leaders.25 The most damning portion of the
report found that between 1960 and 1965, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency ("CIA") was involved in several plots to assassinate
Fidel Castro, dictator of communist Cuba.26
The Church Committee found that the CIA Operation Mon-
goose sought to eliminate Castro with a number of unlikely weap-
ons, such as poison-tipped pens and cigars, as well as an explod-
ing seashell that was to be placed near Castro's favorite scuba
spots.27 Issuing a document consisting of hundreds of pages, the
Church Committee was unable "to make a finding that the assas-
sination plots were authorized by the Presidents or other persons
above the governmental agency or agencies involved,"28 but did
find "that the system of executive command and control was so
ambiguous that it [was] difficult to be certain at what levels as-
sassination activity was known and authorized."2" The Church
Committee strongly concluded that assassination was both legally
and morally repugnant to a democratic people and should never
be associated with the United States: "[A]ssassination is incom-
patible with American principles, international order, and moral-
ity. It should be rejected as a tool of foreign policy."3
24. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
25. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 21. The Church Committee issued a final
report in 1976. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976) [here-
inafter FINAL REPORT].
26. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott & Col. Manuel Supervielle, Promoting Human
Rights Values in Cuba's Post-Castro Military, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. 11 (1999) (examining the
opportunity to promote human rights in Cuban military after Castro by analogy to the
U.S. efforts following the Cold War).
27. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 21, at 72, 85.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 1.
[Vol. 37:751
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Curiously, despite the exhaustive research done by the Church
Committee on assassination and the call for "a statute which
would make it a criminal offense,"3' Congress never enacted legis-
lation to legally ban the use of assassination as an instrument of
foreign policy, leaving the matter to the President via executive
order.32 Although executive orders are policy and not law, this
distinction is functionally irrelevant, particularly in regard to the
politically charged issue of assassination.3
President Ford's order on assassination mandated that "[n]o
employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in, political assassination."34 Shortly thereaf-
ter, President Carter followed suit with his own slightly modified
version that deleted the word "political."35 In 1981, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,333 on assassination.36 The
pertinent portion reads: "No person employed by or acting on be-
half of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, assassination." 7 Subsequent Presidents have not al-
tered President Reagan's order banning assassination by agents
of the United States; thus, Executive Order 12,333 remains in ef-
fect.
B. Calls to Repeal Executive Order 12,333
A common and reoccurring theme of frustration runs through
arguments of those who seek the repeal of Executive Order
12,333.38 This frustration reflects a lack of understanding of what
assassination actually means or entails, not what Executive Or-
der 12,333 actually prohibits. In short, the central problem is that
31. Id. at 283; see also id. at 289-91 (drafting a sample statute for a congressional ban
on assassinations).
32. See Major Tyler J. Harder, Time to Repeal the Assassination Ban of Executive Or-
der 12,333: A Small Step in Clarifying Current Law, 172 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2002) (calling for
the removal of section 2.11 of Exec. Order 12,333).
33. See, e.g., Gary D. Solis, Assassination and American Armed Forces, MIL. L. NEWS,
Autumn 2001, at 6.
34. Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5(g), 3 C.F.R. 90, 101 (1976).
35. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112, 129 (1978).
36. Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.11, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982). President Reagan's ver-
sion is actually the same as the Carter executive order.
37. Id.
38. See Harder, supra note 32, at 2 (discussing the "obvious confusion" regarding vari-
ous meanings attached to assassination).
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people use the same word-assassination-and assume that eve-
ryone is employing the same meaning. Of course, this situation is
aggravated both by the brevity of Executive Order 12,333, which
provides no definition for assassination, and the fact that it
makes no attempt to distinguish between instances of lawful kill-
ing and instances of assassination; unlawful killing.39
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina amplified this confu-
sion when he remarked on September 11, 2001 that he was in fa-
vor of taking whatever action was necessary, including assassina-
tion, to punish those responsible for the attacks on the United
States: "I hope I will live to see the day when it will once again be
the policy of the United States of America to go after the kind of
sneaky enemies who created this morning's mayhem."4 ° Then,
just over a week after the terrorist attacks, senior news corre-
spondent Daniel Schorr forcefully urged policymakers to do away
with the ban on assassination.4 Schorr wrote: "A 25-year-old ex-
ecutive order reflecting the reaction to mindless cold-war plotting
against President Castro and other third-world leaders seems to-
tally anachronistic after Sept. 11."" He continued: "It is time to
rescind an assassination ban that has no more reason for exist-
ing."43 In fact, in the days immediately after the attacks on Amer-
ica, Congressman Bob Barr of Georgia proposed a bill in the
House of Representatives which would have nullified Executive
Order 12,333. 4"
Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and Congress passed no
legislation regarding Executive Order 12,333."5 Shortly thereaf-
ter, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer correctly related to re-
porters that the assassination ban "does not limit America's abil-
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.11, 3 C.F.R. at 213.
40. Chuck McCutcheon, Flawed Intelligence: No Easy Fix, 59 CONG. Q., 2145, 2146
(2001).
41. Daniel Schorr, Stop Winking at "the Ban," CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 21,
2001, at 11. Schorr also points out that he advocated changing Executive Order 12,333 in
1991 to "spare us from presidential double-talk about designs on the lives of foreign foes.'
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Terrorist Elimination Act of 2001, H.R. 19, 107th Cong. (2001) (seeking to nul-
lify section 2.11 of Executive Order 12,333).
45. See Harder, supra note 32, at 23-26 (discussing similar misstatements about the
need to repeal Executive Order 12,333 during the Gulf War).
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ity to act in self-defense."46 The elimination of terrorists could re-
quire, Fleischer remarked, "acts which involved the lives of oth-
ers."
47
Although Fleischer rightly understood in September 2001 that
the ban on assassination did not prohibit the United States from
taking actions in self-defense against specific threats,4 he later
seemed to have lapsed into the same mindset of misunderstand-
ing. At an October 1, 2002 press conference, Fleischer voiced sup-
port for non-American actors seeking to assassinate Saddam
Hussein.49 When asked about the cost of a possible war with Iraq,
spokesman Fleischer remarked: "[tihe cost of a one-way ticket is
substantially less than [the cost of war] .... The cost of one bullet,
if the Iraqi people take it on themselves, is substantially less than
that." ° While the assassination of Saddam Hussein by his own
people would not violate Executive Order 12,333, reporters im-
mediately asked Fleischer if the Bush Administration was en-
couraging assassination.51 Fleischer shrewdly stopped short of us-
ing the term "assassination" in reference to Saddam Hussein,52
perhaps remembering that such a call to the Iraqi people would
violate the customary law on assassination.
Without'question, the traditional concept of assassination abso-
lutely prohibits one nation from encouraging others, in this case
the Iraqi people, to murder the leader of an unfriendly govern-
ment.54 Nevertheless, as the United States gears up for possible
war with Iraq,55 national news media sources continue to specu-
late about the assassination of the Iraqi dictator. Numerous
newspapers cite reports by "senior intelligence experts," 6 which
46. Nancy Benac, Assassination Ban Gets New Look, Associated Press, Sept. 22, 2001,
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/09/apO92201.html.
47. Id.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
49. See Walter Pincus, Attack May Spark Coup in Iraq, Say U.S. Analysts, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 2002, at Al.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See Fleisher Backs Hussein's Slaying, supra note 23. "Asked whether the admini-
stration was advocating the assassination of Hussein, Fleischer repeatedly replied: 'Re-
gime change is welcome in whatever form that it takes.'" Id.
52. See id.
53. See infra Part III.
54. See infra Part III.
55. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Pincus, supra note 49.
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state that Saddam Hussein would probably be assassinated by
"members of his inner circle in the final days or hours before U.S.
forces launch a major ground attack. 5 7
Those who call the loudest for abandoning Executive Order
12,333 mistakenly feel that it might impede the expeditious
prosecution of the War on Terror-either against al-Qaida leaders
or senior leaders of the handful of totalitarian regimes that back
terrorism.5" To date, however, neither Congress nor the President
has taken steps that would blunt the ban on assassination.59 The
reason for this inactivity rests in a mixed bag of historical, legal,
and policy considerations. Still, there are several strong argu-
ments for abandoning the current executive order on assassina-
tion, not because it impedes the War on Terror, but rather, be-
cause it is more confusing than helpful in defining the lawful use
of military force against legitimate targets-whether in peace-
time or war-to include the senior leadership of hostile govern-
ments or terrorist groups.
C. Definitions
Before a concept can be properly discussed, it must be properly
defined. Nowhere is this maxim more appropriate than in ad-
dressing the issue of assassination vis-a-vis Executive Order
12,333. "Assassinate" and "assassination" is defined in leading
dictionaries as follows: "To kill by surprise or secret assault; to
murder by treacherous violence,"" "To murder (a prominent per-
son) by surprise attack, as for political reasons,"61 "To destroy or
injure treacherously;" 2 "The act of deliberately killing someone,
esp[ecially] a public figure, usu[ally] for hire or for political rea-
sons;"63 "To kill suddenly or secretively; murder premeditatedly
57. Id. (stating that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has "spoken publicly
about Iraqis eliminating Hussein themselves, either through assassination or sending him
into exile").
58. See McCutcheon, supra note 40, at 2146.
59. See id.
60. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 164 (2d
ed. 1936).
61. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 82 (3d ed. 1993).
62. Id.
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (7th ed. 1999).
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and treacherously,"64 "to destroy or denigrate treacherously and
viciously."65
A comparison of most definitions reveals that the common
meaning associated with the term assassination is "murder by
surprise" usually carried out for "political purposes."" One com-
mentator, Major Tyler J. Harder, believes that the best way to
capture the meaning of assassination is to view it as a combina-
tion of three essential elements: "(1) a murder, (2) of a specifically
targeted figure, (3) for a political purpose."67 Thus, an assassina-
tion must contain all three elements or the killing will not meet
the requirements of an assassination.6" Harder's approach pro-
vides a good starting point because it focuses on the elements of
murder-always an illegal act-and politics-a concept generally
reserved for activities outside the sphere of warfare.69
Since assassination is universally regarded as murder, it is im-
portant to distinguish the concept of murder, which is always il-
legal, from the concept of killing, which may or may not be ille-
gal. ° Unfortunately, the distinction between murder and killing
is often blurred in modern society, contributing to a lack of clarity
on the subject of assassination. Many postmodernists7" errone-
ously believe, for example, that it is somehow immoral for the
state to take the life of another human being under any circum-
stances.7 For them, the concept of nullen crimen sine poena (no
crime without punishment) does not extend to taking the life of
64. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 89 (1st ed. 1966).
65. Id.
66. Harder, supra note 32, at 5.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
71. Postmodernism is a mid-twentieth century intellectual movement that asserts
that there is no real objective knowledge, only interpretations. See Stephen M. Feldman,
Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 157
(1999). The movement is traced to nihilist philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. See LAWRENCE
J. HATAB, A NIETZSCHEAN DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY: AN EXPERIMENT IN POSTMODERNIST
POLITICS 13 (1995).
72. See AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN CONDITION (2001).
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another human.73 Hence, in their minds, all killing is both im-
moral and illegal.74
Interestingly, definitional problems regarding the lawfulness of
killing another human can be traced back to the Biblical prohibi-
tion found in the Decalogue at Exodus 20:13 and Deuteronomy
5:17, which many widely regarded English translations, such as
the King James version of the Bible, incorrectly render as "Thou
shalt not kill. 75 In fact, the correct translation of the Hebrew into
the English is "Thou shalt not murder."76 The Hebrew word for
"kill" is not used in the prohibitions of Exodus 20:13 and Deuter-
onomy 5:17. The Hebrew phrase that is used, "lo tirtzach," "refers
only to the criminal act of homicide, not [for instance] taking the
life of enemy soldiers in legitimate warfare."7 In fact, the Mosaic
law is filled with detailed laws that specifically mandate that the
state should lawfully kill certain humans convicted under the
rule of law for such crimes as murder, kidnapping, etc. 78 The Old
Testament principle is properly seen as centering on the duty of
the state to protect its citizens on interior lines from domestic
criminal behavior.
In turn, the Mosaic law also sets out a detailed law of war co-
dex which provides for the protection of citizens on exterior lines
by specifically authorizing the killing of enemy combatants.79
From the Judeo tradition, killing enemy combatants in battle is
not murder.80
Assassination, then, is clearly identified and properly classified
as a type of killing that is unlawful, i.e., a form of murder, and
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Exodus 20:13 (King James).
76. See Exodus 20:13 (New American Standard) ("You shall not murder.").
77. R.B. THIEME, JR., FREEDOM THROUGH MILITARY VICTORY 50-51 (3d ed. 1996).
78. See, e.g., Exodus 21:12 (New American Standard) ("He who strikes a man so that
he dies shall surely be put to death.").
79. Deuteronomy 20:13 (New American Standard). Deuteronomy contains an entire
law of war code relating to the treatment of non-combatants, combatants, and even dam-
age to the environment:
When you besiege a city a long time, to make war against it in order to cap-
ture it, you shall not destroy its trees by swinging an axe against them; for
you may eat from them, and you shall not cut them down. For is the tree of
the field a man, that it should be besieged by you?
Deuteronomy 20:19 (New American Standard).
80. Id. 20:13 (New American Standard).
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murder is always defined as "the killing of a human being with
malice aforethought."81 Although Executive Order 12,333 does not
define assassination, this silence certainly provides no support for
advocating a "new" definition of assassination that would some-
how characterize the concept as anything other than what it is-
murder. Furthermore, since murder is an intrinsically illegal act,
the definitional problem automatically defeats any reasoned ad-
vancement of the proposition that murder, i.e., assassination, can
somehow be made lawful.
In other words, if murder is a violation of both domestic and in-
ternational law, Executive Order 12,333 really does not make il-
legal something that was not already illegal. Therefore, doing
away with Executive Order 12,333 would not allow the United
States to engage in assassination, either in peacetime or wartime.
Indeed, revoking Executive Order 12,333 would only send a nega-
tive signal, suggesting to the world that the United States did
away with the ban so that it could commit an illegal act of mur-
der.
III. HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF ASSASSINATION
"War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."
Carl von Clausewitz
8 2
The word "assassination" is derived from the Arabic word
"hashishiyyin" which refers to the practice of an eleventh century
Muslim "brotherhood" that was specifically devoted to killing
their religious and political enemies in any manner available. 3
Because American history has witnessed the assassination of
several Presidents,84 most Americans view assassination as some-
thing that is carried out against political figures. To be sure, the
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
82. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1976) (1832).
83. FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MURDER: FROM TYRANNICIDE TO TERRORISM 99-
102 (1985).
84. Presidents Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William McKinley, and John F.
Kennedy were all killed by assassins.
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concept of assassination is far more ancient and can apply with
equal validity to various infamous incidents in history, including
the murder by surprise for political purposes of Julius Caesar by
Brutus and his fellow plotters in 44 B.C., 5 as well as to Hebrew
Zealots who conducted random acts of assassination against the
occupying Romans and those who supported the Romans in Judea
prior to the fall of Jerusalem by the legions of Rome under Titus
in 70 A.D. 6
There are even historical instances where the concept of assas-
sination was incorporated as an integral part of certain religious
beliefs. For example, when the British entered India in the nine-
teenth century, they encountered a Hindu cult devoted to the
goddess Kli that required its members to commit murder by
surprise upon random victims as a form of worship. In contrast
to other assassinations, these murders by surprise were not for
political purposes, but for religious purposes.8 8
Early Western scholars discussed the matter of assassination
both in the context of war and peace. These scholars generally all
viewed assassination as an act directed against the leader of a
country. 9 Interestingly, some of the earliest commentators, such
as theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas, felt that killing
an evil sovereign for the common good might be legally justified.9 °
The Aquinas view held little sway with subsequent commenta-
tors,9 however, particularly following the 1648 Peace of West-
phalia and the rise of the nation-state.92
85. See MARGARET LYTTELTON & WERNER FORMAN, THE ROMANS: THEIR GODS AND
THEIR BELIEFS 61 (1984) (discussing the murder of Julius Caesar by Brutus, Cassius, and
their followers to restore the Republican institution in Rome).
86. FLAVIuS JOSEPHUS, WARS OF THE JEWS, in JOSEPHUS: COMPLETE WORKS 526-27
(William Whiston trans., Kregel Pub. 1974) (1867).
87. See, e.g., DAVID KINSLEY, HINDU GODDESSES: VISIONS OF THE DIVINE FEMININE IN
THE HINDU RELIGIOUS TRADITION 116-31 (1986).
88. See id.
89. See Lieutenant Commander Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 134 MIL. L. REv. 123,126-30 (1991).
90. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS
AND ETHICS 65 n.8 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1988) (1266-1273)
(stating that Aquinas advocated the killing of tyrants in the "medieval equivalent of his
doctoral dissertation"). But see id. (stating that Aquinas later argues that the fate of ty-
rants should be left to "the judgment of God" in De Regimine Princiam).
91. See FORD, supra note 83, at 1-2. Some commentators still voice the assertion that
the intentional killing of a tyrant is not per se assassination, particularly if the killing is
carried out by the people under the rule of the tyrant. See Ernest W. Lefever, Death to
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In fact, extremely sensitive to the concept of reciprocity as the
key element in international intercourse between nation-states,
most seventeenth century scholars rejected the idea of assassinat-
ing a leader in peacetime under any circumstances and equally
frowned on the use of assassination as a legitimate use of armed
force during war.93 Regardless of the method of attack used dur-
ing warfare, the attack should never involve treachery, a term
commonly associated with assassination but seldom defined.94 In-
fluenced by the Code of Chivalry,95 many international jurists in
the area felt that assassination should not be employed in order
that the "honor of arms be preserved, and public order and the
safety of sovereigns and generals not be unduly threatened."96
Hugo Grotius, considered by some the father of international
law and author of the first real codification of rules relating to the
conduct of warfare, spent a great deal of time exploring the mat-
ter of assassination in the context of war.97 Grotius used "treach-
ery" or "treacherous murder"98 as an analytical starting point in
his commentaries.99 Understanding the issue of reciprocity, he
discussed assassination as something that "violate[s] an express
or tacit obligation of good faith" between countries.'00 For Grotius,
a violation of natural law or the "law of nations""1 ' certainly oc-
Saddam Hussein? Let His Own People Decide, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at B7. Such a
killing is called "tyrannicide." See FORD supra note 83, at 2.
92. Many trace the origin of international law and the concept of the nation-state to
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War. See CHARLES G.
FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-22 (4th ed. 1965). It was during this period that a
number of European countries recognized themselves as part of a small community of sov-
ereign nation-states which were guided by certain norms and standards of international
behavior to include law of war considerations. Id.
93. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
94. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 4, 5.
95. The so-called Code of Chivalry was a compilation of rules associated with the
qualities a medieval knight was supposed to possess, such as courage, honor, and the pro-
tection of the helpless and women. See LEON GAUTIER, CHIVALRY 9-32 (Jacques Levron ed.
& D.C. Dunning trans., 1959).
96. Zengel, supra note 89, at 125.
97. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, (1625) reprinted in 1 THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 16 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
98. See Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Kelly, Comment, Assassination in War Time, 30
MIL. L. REV. 101, 102 (1965) (exploring the views of several early commentators on the
matter of assassination).
99. See GROTIUS, supra note 97, at 39-41.
100. Id. at 38.
101. The term "law of nations" was an early synonym for international law. The United
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curred if a leader was killed by those that had an obligation to
him; such an act of assassination would be treacherous." 2 Con-
versely, if an enemy leader is ambushed or tricked into a trap by
opposing soldiers and killed, then natural law was not violated.0 3
Grotius wrote: "It is in fact permissible to kill an enemy in any
place whatsoever .... According to the law of nations not only
those who do such deeds, but also those who instigate others to do
them, are to be considered free from blame."104 In any event,
Grotius strongly disapproved of putting a price on the head of an
enemy leader, reasoning that this would encourage the leader's
subjects to kill him treacherously, i.e., by assassination.0 5
Alberico Gentili, another prominent scholar of his day, voiced a
similar line of argument regarding assassination.' 6 A bit more
pragmatic in his approach, Gentili cautioned that killing an en-
emy leader treacherously-by assassination-might actually in-
cite more anger in the enemy population, causing the enemy to
fight harder to avenge the murder.107 In addition, Gentili felt that
the very act of assassination itself lacked the valor that one might
gain in victory on the field of battle."0 ' As did Grotius, Gentili dis-
tinguished killing an enemy leader by treacherous means from
killing an enemy leader in combat."9 Death on the battlefield was
a lawful circumstance of battle."0
Writing in the eighteenth century, scholar Emmerich de Vattel
also defined assassination as "murder committed by a means of
treachery.""' De Vattel believed that assassination could apply in
both peacetime and war, and applied with equal effect, whether
States Constitution also employs the term. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
102. See GROTIUS, supra note 97, at 39-40.
103. Id. at 39.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 40-41.
106. See 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 168-72 (John C. Rolfe trans.,
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1995) (1612).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. 3 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW:
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 288
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1995) (1758).
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the deed was done by the people of the leader or subjects of an
opposing country.1 1 2 De Vattel wrote:
Hence I mean by assassination a murder committed by means of
treachery, whether the deed be done by persons who are subjects of
him who is assassinated, or of his sovereign, and who are therefore
traitors, or whether it be done by any other agent who makes his
way in as a suppliant or refugee, or as a turncoat, or even as an
alien; and I assert that the deed is a shameful and revolting one,
both on the part of him who executes and of him who commands
it. 1
13
Furthermore, de Vattel felt that punishing those individuals
who assassinated the sovereign was the responsibility of the
world community." 4 In his book, de Vattel encouraged all civi-
lized nations "in the interest of the common safety of mankind, to
join forces and unite to punish" those who engaged in assassina-
tion. 15
Thus, the weight of authority from early Western scholars
might be encapsulated as follows: First, most defined assassina-
tion as an illegal act most commonly associated with targeting
and killing enemy leaders in peacetime or war. Second, all early
commentators recognized the lawfulness of targeting and killing
the enemy leader in war, although some considered killing the
enemy leader in a treacherous manner off the battlefield as an act
of assassination.
The early American position on the matter viewed assassina-
tion as an illegal tool in both peacetime and wartime. The first
significant mention of assassination occurred during the Ameri-
can Civil War with the adoption by Union forces" 6 of a codifica-
tion of the law of war known as the Lieber Code." 7 On April 24,
1863, the Lieber Code was promulgated as Army General Orders
112. Id. at 288-89.
113. Id. at 288.
114. See id. at 289.
115. Id.
116. See THE LIEBER CODE (1863), reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 158 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
117. See id.; see also DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JiRf TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3
(1988). Francis Lieber was a German international law scholar and professor at Columbia
University. RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 2 (1983).
Lieber was asked by the federal authorities to draft a code for the conduct of war on land.
Id. at 14-15.
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Number 100 by the Secretary of War.1"' Disregarding the distinc-
tion between peacetime and wartime scenarios, Section IX states:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual be-
longing to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile
government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any cap-
tor, any more than the modem law of peace allows such interna-
tional outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest
retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of
such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations
look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of ene-
mies as relapses into barbarism.
119
Since the somewhat confusing definition of the Lieber Code,
subsequent American legal views on assassination have improved
only slightly. Surprisingly, the next significant mention of the
concept of assassination is not found until 1956, in Field Manual
27-10, Department of the Army Field Manual of the Law of Land
Warfare ("FM 27-10").12° FM 27-10 is the Army's non-punitive
codification of existing international laws relating to the conduct
of armed conflict.121 Paragraph 31 of FM 27-10, entitled "Assassi-
nation and Outlawry," quotes the Annex to the Hague Conven-
tion,122 stating that "[uit is especially forbidden ... to kill or
wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
or army."123 FM 27-10 then goes on to describe this sentence in
the context of American military law:
This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription,
or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as
well as offering a reward for an enemy "dead or alive." It does not,
however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the en-
118. See THE LIEBER CODE, supra note 116, at 158. General Orders 100 was entitled:
"Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field." Id. Two
years prior to the Lieber Code, the Southern Confederacy adopted its own code of conduct
for land warfare entitled "Articles of War, for the Government of the Army of the Confed-
erate States of America." ARMY REGULATIONS, ADOPTED FOR THE USE OF THE ARMY OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES app., at 171 (Richmond, Va., West & Johnson Publishers 1861). In
June of 1863, James A. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, pledged to abide by
most of the substantive provisions of the Lieber Code. See HARTIGAN, supra note 117, at 1.
119. See THE LIEBER CODE, supra note 116, at 184 (emphasis added).
120. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
(1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10], available at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dI
fm127-10/toc.htm.
121. See id. TT 1-14.
122. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2302, 205 C.T.S. 277, 293.
123. Id., quoted in FM 27-10, supra note 120, T1 31.
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emy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or else-
where.
124
To date, one of the very best efforts to handle the legal aspects
of assassination vis-a-vis Executive Order 12,333 is contained in a
1989 legal memorandum written by W. Hays Parks, Chief of the
International Law Branch, International Affairs Division, Office
of the Judge Advocate General. 125 In his memorandum, Parks
does an excellent job explaining the term assassination "in the
context of military operations across the conflict spectrum.' 26 In
essence, Parks correctly concludes that the targeting and killing
of hostile or enemy leaders in an act of self-defense 27 is not an act
of assassination, even if by surprise. 2 '
IV. THE RULE OF LAW RELATING TO THE USE OF FORCE
"The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of
radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and bio-
logical and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technol-
ogy-when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could
attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies
have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking
these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us,
or to harm us, or to harm our friends--and we will oppose them
with all our power."
President George W. Bush
29
A. Traditional Rule of Law Regarding the Use of Force
It is well settled in modern international law that no nation
may engage in aggression130 against any other nation. The defini-
124. Id.
125. See Parks, supra note 94, at 4.
126. Id.
127. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
128. Parks, supra note 94, at 8.
129. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Graduation Exercise of the United States
Military Academy, West Point, New York (June 1, 2002), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
130. The U.N. Definition of Aggression states in main part:
Article 1
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tion of aggression is spelled out in the 1974 U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314 and certainly includes the act of assassina-
tion. 131 According to the Charter of the United Nations ("U.N.
Charter"), "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or the political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."132
With this premise so stated, it is thus equally well recognized
that the legitimate use of force is rooted in the inherent right of
every nation to act in self-defense if it is the object of aggression.
It is also important to realize that aggressive acts are often
carried out by one nation against another without the intent to
provoke full-scale hostilities or war.'33 Likewise, the nation that is
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations ....
Article 2
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression ....
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall ... qual-
ify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State. . . of another
State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of an-
other State... ;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of an-
other State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State... in contravention of the condi-
tions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregu-
lars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein.
G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.N.Y.B. 846, 846-48.
131. Id.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
133. For a discussion of the policy objectives behind aggressive acts, see MYRES S.
McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANS-
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attacked with aggressive force may respond in self-defense with
proportional military action with no intention of going to war.1 4
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter codifies the right of a nation at-
tacked with aggressive violence to engage in self-defense. 3 5 The
doctrine of self-defense, of course, is a customary right of ancient
origin not created by the U.N. Charter. 3 In pertinent part, Arti-
cle 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the in-
herent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed at-
tack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... "137
Thus, the state that engages in acts of aggression, or the unlawful
use of force, may never claim that it is acting under the self-
defense provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Furthermore,
apart from the fundamental requirement of proportionality in the
employment of violence for purposes of self-defense,13 the use of
self-defense can occur in peacetime as well as war.
In the United States, the customary right of self-defense is
usually traced to the 1842 Caroline Doctrine formulated by Secre-
tary of State Daniel Webster in response to an 1837 raid by Ca-
nadian troops into New York.139 Under the Caroline Doctrine a
state may resort to necessary and proportional acts of self-defense
against aggression if such acts arise out of an instant and over-
whelming necessity, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
of deliberation. 4 In the 1837 raid, Canadian troops crossed the
NATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 11-39 (1994).
134. See id. at 241-44.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of the right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.
Id.
136. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 133, at 131-32.
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
138. See Captain James J. McHugh, Forcible Self-Help in International Law, 25 NAVAL
WAR C. REV. 61, 65-66 (1972).
139. Id. at 65.
140. Id.
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United States border without American consent to attack rebels
in New York.141
On numerous occasions, the United States has lawfully exer-
cised the inherent right of self-defense against individuals or
states in both peacetime and wartime environments. President
Clinton, for example, fired cruise missiles at several al-Qaida ter-
rorist training camps in Afghanistan following the 1998 al-Qaida
attack on the United States embassies in Africa.142 This military
action occurred during peacetime and was permitted under the
rule of law regarding self-defense, as President Clinton's actions
were a direct result of the al-Qaida attack."4 Even if the leader
Osama bin Laden was targeted in the attacks, President Clinton's
actions would not be classified as attempted assassination.'44
Similarly, in the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein himself was
a legitimate military target and his death by coalition forces
would not have been an assassination.'45 As the commander in
chief of the Iraqi military, Hussein could have been legally tar-
geted and killed.146 In war, enemy combatants are legitimate tar-
gets for attack so long as the hostile forces are not killed with
treachery, e.g., while legitimately visiting a protected place such
as a hospital.'47 The fact that Hussein was not specifically tar-
geted was clearly a political decision, although President George
H. Bush is said to have remarked: 'We're not in the position of
targeting Saddam Hussein, but no one will weep for him when he
is gone." 14' Despite the lawfulness of killing the enemy leader in
wartime, there often exists an unwillingness to specifically target
that individual. 49
141. Id.
142. James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets Tied to Ter-
rorist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
143. See Parks, supra note 94, at 5.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. All Things Considered: Time Has Come for Reviewing the Executive Order that
Forbids U.S. Government Sponsorship of Political Assassinations (NPR radio broadcast,
Sept. 17, 2001).
149. Parks, supra note 94, at 6 n.4.
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W. Hays Parks correctly recognizes that a state may use mili-
tary force in peacetime if it is acting in self-defense since such
acts are not considered assassination:
Historically the United States has resorted 'to the use of military
force in peacetime where another nation has failed to discharge its
international responsibilities in protecting U.S. citizens from acts of
violence originating in or launched from its sovereign territory, or
has been culpable in aiding and abetting international criminal ac-
tivities. 
150
After listing several historical examples of the United States'
use of military force in self-defense,"' including the 1986 bombing
of "terrorist-related targets in Libya,"152 Parks concludes: "Hence
there is historical precedent for the use of military force to cap-
ture or kill individuals whose peacetime actions constitute a di-
rect threat to U.S. citizens or U.S. national security.""
Indeed, immediately following the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the United States Congress clearly recognized the
inherent right of self-defense in peacetime. While Congress never
"declared war"154 under the provisions of Article I of the Constitu-
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id. Parks lists the following six examples to amplify his point:
-1804-1805: Marine First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon led an expedition
into Libya to capture or kill the Barbary pirates.
-1916: General "Blackjack" Pershing led a year-long campaign into Mexico
to capture or kill the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa following Villa's attack on
Columbus, New Mexico.
-1928-1932: U.S. Marines conducted a campaign to capture or kill the Nica-
raguan bandit leader Augusto Cesar Sandino.
-1967: U.S. Army personnel assisted the Bolivian Army in its campaign to
capture or kill Ernesto "Che" Guevara.
-1985: U.S. Naval forces were used to force an Egypt Air airliner to land at
Sigonella, Sicily, in an attempt to prevent the escape of the Achille Lauro hi-
jackers.
-1986: U.S. naval and air forces attacked terrorist-related targets in Libya
in response to the Libyan government's continued employment of terrorism
as a foreign policy means.
Id.
152. Id.; see also Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Targeted Qaddafi Compound
After Tracing Terror Message, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1986, at A24. The United States spe-
cifically targeted the home and headquarters of the Libyan dictator, Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi. Id. Among the casualties was Qaddafi's adopted daughter. Id.
153. Parks, supra note 94, at 7.
154. Certain statutory consequences attach to a congressionally declared war. For ex-
ample, "[whenever there is a declared war.., all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of
the hostile nation or government ... shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, se-
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tion,'55 Congressional members quickly passed a joint resolution
that left no doubt as to their desire to authorize President Bush
to use military force in self-defense.156 This joint resolution was
passed by every member of the Senate and every member of the
House of Representatives, save one." 7 Among other things, the
resolution recognized the inherent right of self-defense "under the
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States ... ."158 The resolution
also authorized the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.
159
Congress clearly understood that targeting individual terrorists
associated with the attacks on the United States was not assassi-
nation, but an appropriate response in self-defense to unlawful
aggression.
16°
B. Use of Preemptive Military Force
From a legal perspective, the most challenging issue associated
with the continuing War on Terror is the fact that both the na-
ture of the enemy and the nature of the threat have changed
dramatically, resulting in a necessary reassessment in the rule of
law. In his State of the Union Address of January 29, 2002,
President Bush cautioned the American people that although the
Taliban regime had been defeated on the battlefield, the War on
Terror was far from over. 6' In his speech, President Bush also
specifically labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as "an axis of
cured, and removed as alien enemies." 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
155. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 11.
156. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
157. [2001-2002] 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 23,027; [2001-2002] 2 Cong. Index (CCH)
37,087.
158. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224.
159. Id. § 2(a).
160. See McHugh, supra note 138, at 76.
161. See Sanger, supra note 10.
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evil," due to their continuing support and sponsorship of terrorist
groups. 6 2 This statement signaled the President's resolve that
the United States would "not permit the world's most dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weap-
ons."
163
President Bush's speech caused an immediate flurry of debate,
both as a policy matter and as a legal matter. Considering that
the use of armed force can only be justified under international
law when used in self-defense, ' can the United States go beyond
the rhetoric and actually extend the War on Terror to those rogue
nations who are identified so closely as supporters and sponsors
of terrorist activities, but have not actually physically engaged in
overt acts of aggression against the United States? Under what
conditions is it permissible for the United States to "go after the
haystack and not just the needle?"
Indeed, if the use of WMD by a fanatical terrorist is on the near
horizon, do the traditional international rules related to the use
of force-i.e., force allowable in self-defense-actually work in the
real world of the al-Qaida virtual state?165 In other words, must
the United States idly wait for a catastrophic terrorist attack be-
fore it can respond, or does a threatened nation have the right to
engage in preemptive self-defense? 66
Although many seemed surprised and/or dismayed that any
state would seriously advocate such a position, the concept of
preemptive self-defense is not a new doctrine.167 More commonly
known as anticipatory self-defense, this doctrine is a well-
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also President George W. Bush, Address Before Congress (Sept. 20, 2001),
in Bush Issues Ultimatum to Taliban, Calls upon Nation and World to Unite and Destroy
Terrorism, CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 22, 2001, at 2226. President Bush issued the ultimatum
in a speech delivered to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. Id. at 2226.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair echoed this sentiment when he remarked that the Tali-
ban had to "'surrender terrorism, or surrender power.'" lain MacWhirter, Does Tony Really
Know What He's Getting Us Into?, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Oct. 3, 2001, at 16.
164. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
165. Many have described the al-Qaida as a virtual-state in recognition of its complex
structure and similar functions to that of the nation-state. Bobbitt, supra note 5. All that
the organization lacks is a fixed geographic boundary. Id.
166. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 133 (discussing the considerations be-
hind the use of preemptive self-defense).
167. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 154-90 (1990).
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established principle of customary international law. 6 ' The most
striking instance in modern history occurred in the 1967 Six Day
War when Israel, anticipating a full-scale armed attack from
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and others, attacked Arab airfields first.169
The doctrine of preemptive self-defense holds that when a state is
faced with an imminent armed attack it may resort to propor-
tional acts of preemptive self-defense. 171 Indeed, some scholars
view the concept of anticipatory self-defense as inconclusive. For
example, one textbook on national security law states: "Past prac-
tice is inconclusive, but it suggests that a state facing an immi-
nent and potentially devastating armed attack may escape con-
demnation for a preemptive response. 171
Parks lists three forms of self-defense that the United States
recognizes as appropriate for unilateral action under the inherent
right of self-defense, including (1) force used "[algainst an actual
use of force, or hostile act"; (2) "[p]reemptive self defense against
an imminent use of force"; and (3) "[s]elf defense against a con-
tinuing threat.1 7
2
In September 2002, one year after the attacks on America, the
White House set out its position on the preemptive use of force in
the thirty-one page National Security Strategy. 73 In it, the White
House assesses the necessity for the use of the doctrine of pre-
emptive military force in self-defense 7 4 -i.e., the imminence fac-
tor, as follows:
168. See id.
169. See Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, in MOORE ET
AL., supra note 167, at 162, 162-63.
170. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 167.
171. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 842
(2002).
172. Parks, supra note 94, at 7.
173. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 17.
174. Parks' third category of "self defense against a continuing threat" seems to fore-
shadow the National Security Strategy. Parks, supra note 94, at 7. Parks writes:
[Self-defense against a continuing threat] has been exercised on several occa-
sions within the past decade [the 1980s]. It formed the basis for the U.S.
Navy air strike against Syrian military objectives in Lebanon on 4 December
1983, following Syrian attacks on U.S. Navy F-14 TARPS flights supporting
the multinational peacekeeping force in Beirut the preceding day. It also was
the basis for the air strikes against terrorist-related targets in Libya on the
evening of 15 April 1986.
Id. at 7 n.8.
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It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of
this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the
United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we
have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the im-
mediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that
could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit
that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.
175
After reviewing the success story of strategic deterrence as an
effective policy during the Cold War era,176 the National Security
Strategy goes on to relate why deterrence will not work against
the new and deadly threat of militant Islamic terrorists "whose
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of inno-
cents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and
whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap be-
tween states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD
compels us to action."
77
Recognizing that the "United States will not use force in all
cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-
emption as a pretext for aggression," 7 s the National Security
Strategy spells out a three-part policy regarding the use of pre-
emptive self-defense, stating that "[t]o support preemptive op-
tions," the United States will (1) "build better, more integrated
intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information
on threats, wherever they may emerge"; (2) "coordinate closely
with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous
175. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 17, at 15.
176. Id. at 15. The document stressed two other attendant concerns:
[1] In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a
generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective de-
fense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to
work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with
the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.
[21 In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons
of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. To-
day, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For
rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression
against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to at-
tempt to blackmail the United .States and our allies to prevent us from deter-
ring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see
these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superior-
ity of the United States.
Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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threats"; and (3) "continue to transform our military forces to en-
sure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve
decisive results."79
On a more pragmatic level, the actual use of preemptive force
must necessarily seek to address the traditional element of re-
sponding to an imminent threat, not just a potential threat.8 0
While it is certainly prudent for America to sternly warn rogue
nations who support or sponsor terrorism that they will be held
absolutely accountable for any acts of aggression, the United
States must weigh a number of factors prior to actually utilizing
the preemptive use of military force. At a minimum, this would
mean weighing: (1) the gravity of the threat; (2) the past prac-
tices, mutates mutandis (in other contexts), of the terrorist or the
state that stands behind terrorism; (3) the exhaustion of all other
reasonable means short of force; and (4) an assessment of the re-
percussions if armed force is employed.
Obviously, given the gravity of the threat, reasonable minds
can easily conclude that the Bush Administration is correct in its
use of preemptive self-defense under the rule of law. The concept
of preemptive self-defense is very similar if not synonymous with
the long recognized customary doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense which is generally permissible when faced with an "im-
minent" armed attack, such as small-unit engagements, in which
combat units need not wait for the enemy to strike."8 ' Regardless,
the use of force in self-defense must be reasonably proportionate
to the specific danger that is to be averted.8 2
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive ac-
tions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend our-
selves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our ad-
versaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
183
179. Id. at 16.
180. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 133, at 231.
181. See Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Stafford, How to Keep Military Personnel from Going
to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: Jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of Deadly Force, ARMY
LAW., Nov. 2000, at 1, 5. But see Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INTL L. 872, 878 (1947).
182. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 133, at 217-18.
183. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 17, at 15.
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Finally, there is a substantive link to the Bush Administra-
tion's call for preemptive self-defense and another legal theory
known as "counterproliferation self-help."" 4 The concept of coun-
terproliferation self-help is concerned with rogue totalitarian
States that either seek to acquire WMD or already possess
them. 8 5 The concept argues that when the threat of a totalitarian
state or terrorist group using a weapon of mass destruction di-
rectly threatens the national survival of another state, the
threatened state has the right to engage in "preventive or pre-
emptive use of force to either deter acquisition plans, eliminate
acquisition programs or destroy illicit WMD sites at any stage in
the proliferator's acquisition efforts."" 6 The 1981 Israeli air at-
tack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor is the best illustration of
this doctrine, although the U.N. condemned the attack and pro-
claimed that Iraq had the right to seek reparations.
8 7
Interestingly, as the United States prepares to engage Iraq in
combat, Congress has essentially concurred in the concept of us-
ing military force under President Bush's preemptive self-defense
doctrine. On October 12, 2002, Congress passed, by a large mar-
gin of bipartisan support, a joint resolution authorizing the use of
force against Iraq. 8 8 The resolution authorizes the President "to
use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to ... defend the national se-
curity of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq." 189
C. The Israeli Model
How does the concept of preemptive self-defense play out in re-
gards to individuals who pose a threat to the national security in-
terests of the United States? In his third category of legitimate
acts of self-defense-"self defense against a continuing
184. See, e.g., Colonel Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A
Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-
struction, 27 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483, 485 (1999).
185. See id. at 484.
186. Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
187. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 171, at 842.
188. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
189. Id. § 3(a)(1).
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threat" 9°-Parks agrees that the preemptive use of military force
against terrorists would be permissible and would not be assassi-
nation.19" ' Parks specifically asserts the following:
This right of self defense would be appropriate to the attack of ter-
rorist leaders where their actions pose a continuing threat to U.S.
citizens or the national security of the United States. As with an at-
tack on a guerrilla infrastructure, the level to which attacks could be
carried out against individuals within a terrorist infrastructure
would be a policy rather than a legal decision.
192
As the United States tests the new doctrine of preemptive self-
defense against Iraq, it is useful to consider how the Israelis have
employed the concept to target and kill known senior terrorist
leaders in the ongoing Palestinian conflict. In fact, the United
States has generally supported the Israeli military's use of pre-
emptive force in regards to the killing of certain Palestinian ter-
rorists. 93 United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz has often cited the Israeli use of preemption with ap-
proval, drawing an early parallel to what Americans must do to
win the War on Terror.'94 Wolfowitz noted that "' [o] ur approach
has been to aim at prevention and not merely punishment. We
are at war. Self-defense requires prevention and sometimes pre-
emption.""95
In this light, the killing of known terrorists is not assassina-
tion, but an act of preemptive self-defense. Israel, of course, does
not call these acts assassination, although the term is often used
by critics to describe the killings of those responsible for the
waves of suicide bombings against innocent Israeli citizens.'96 In-
stead, the Israeli givernment refers to the acts of killing as "tar-
190. Parks, supra note 94, at 7.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 7 n.8.
193. But see Don Singleton, U.S. Scolds Israel Civilians Injured in Strike at Terror
Chief, DAILY NEWS (New York), Sept. 28, 2002, at 9. The State Department criticized Is-
rael in a botched attempt to kill the top bomb maker for Hamas, Mohammed Deif. Id. Deif
reportedly survived an airstike that wounded thirty-five civilians. Id. Nevertheless, the
United States has never characterized the killing of terrorists by Israel as assassination.
Id.
194. See Steven Erlanger, Russian Aide Warns U.S. Not to Extend War to Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A10.
195. Id.
196. See Samantha M. Shapiro, The Year in Ideas: A to Z; Announced Assassinations,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 9, 2001, at 54.
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geted thwarting," "liquidation," or "elimination."197 An October
2001 poll taken at Tel Aviv University found that seventy-seven
percent of Israeli Jews approved of the policy.198 Dr. Ely Karmon
of the Israel-based International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism believes that the Israeli use of preemptive self-defense
is in fact the best means of responding to the terrorists since the
practice is largely carried out with concern for collateral civilian
causalities. 99 Karmon notes that the Israeli military is "'not
bombing indiscriminately or using heavy weapons as was neces-
sary to hit Hezbollah outposts in Lebanon. Here we have much
more control, greater intelligence and the ability to act.' 2 °°
One recent highly visible public killing was the death of the
Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine, Mustapha Zibri, on August 27, 2001.21 An Israeli helicop-
ter fired two rockets and obliterated his office in Ramallah. 202 Zi-
bri's office was located three doors down from the office of
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.08
The mechanics for how the killings are carried out generally
starts with Israeli intelligence that process reports and informa-
tion from a variety of sources, which include Palestinian collabo-
rators.0 4 Using this information, the government compiles a list
of people that they have concluded are involved in terrorist activ-
ity.2 5 They next give the Palestinian Authority the list of sus-
pects for arrest, which proves futile since the Palestinian Author-
ity refuses to act on the information.2 6 Thus, when an
opportunity to kill the terrorist presents, itself, the approval to
kill is given and Israeli helicopters or snipers kill the terrorist by
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Shapiro, supra note 196, at 54; see also Matt Rees, The Work of Assassins: From
Both Sides of the Intifadeh, High-Tech Hit Squads and Low-Tech Vigilantes Wield Street
Justice, TIME, Jan. 15, 2001, at 36.
202. Shapiro, supra note 196, at 54.
203. Id.
204. See Rees, supra note 201, at 37.
205. Shapiro, supra note 196, at 54.
206. Id.
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surprise attack at a location calculated to reduce collateral dam-
ages to civilians.2 °7
V. APPLICATION OF LEGAL FORCE
"There is a coming terrorist war [against the United States],
[that] is part of a total war which sees the whole society as an en-
emy, and all members of a society as appropriate objects for vio-
lent actions."
Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick
20 8
The fact that a nation is acting under the rubric of self-defense
does not allow that nation to employ military force in any manner
it so desires. The state acting in self-defense is still required to
adhere to a set of binding international rules associated with how
that force is employed-the law of war or law of armed conflict.20 9
In the modern era, however, where the line between war and
peacetime is inexorably blurred, many of the most basic rules re-
garding military necessity, 210 unnecessary suffering211 and propor-
tionality212 apply equally to the peacetime use of military force.
213
The law of armed conflict describes lawful targets, which can
be destroyed in the proper context of military operations. 214 The
general principle is that military personnel acting in self-defense
207. Id.
208. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Speech at the Jonathan Institute's Conference on Interna-
tional Terrorism, Washington, D.C. (June 25, 1984).
209. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 38 (1990).
210. See FM 27-10, supra note 120, at 3. Military necessity refers to the requirement
that "belligerents refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not actu-
ally necessary for military purposes." Id.
211. Id. 2, 34. The concept of unnecessary suffering forbids the use of certain types
of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering to people or destruction to property.
Id. 34
212. Id. 41. The concept of proportionality refers to the balance between the concrete
and direct military advantage to be gained in the light of the amount of damage to be in-
flicted on the environment and people. Id.
213. Swiss Call a Meeting to Re-Examine the Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2002, at A15. The Swiss government invited selected signatories to the Geneva Conven-
tions to update certain provisions in light of the changing nature of armed conflict. See id.
One issue to be addressed is "how a military objective is appropriately determined and de-
fined in contemporary conflicts." Id.
214. See FM 27-10, supra note 120, at IT 39-47.
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in a peacetime or wartime environment may kill the enemy,
whether lawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents. 215 It is
also clear that "the enemy" may include civilians who take part in
the hostilities.216 An enemy combatant, whether part of an organ-
ized military or a civilian who undertakes military activities, is a
legitimate target at all times and may be lawfully killed, even if
by surprise. 217 This includes the leader of the hostile forces.2"'
Thus, unannounced attacks do not preclude the use of violence
involving'the element of surprise. All "combatants are subject to
attack if they are participating in hostilities through fire, maneu-
ver, and assault; providing logistic, communications, administra-
tive, or other support."219 In addition, "no distinction is made be-
tween an attack accomplished by aircraft, missile, naval gunfire,
artillery, mortar, infantry assault, ambush, land mine or booby
trap, a single shot by a sniper, a commando attack, or other, simi-
lar means."22° It is not an act of unlawful assassination to kill in-
dividuals in this context.221
In turn, the law of armed conflict absolutely prohibits the kill-
ing of noncombatants, except as a matter of collateral damage
where civilians may be killed ancillary to the lawful attack of a
military objective.222 Civilians that maintain close proximity to a
military objective assume the risk of being killed by enemy fire.22a
Since they are neither specifically targeted individuals nor are
they killed by the use of treachery, the killing of such civilians is
not an assassination.224 On the other hand, specifically targeting
innocent civilians as a military objective is always illegal and
criminal.225
215. See id.
216. Id. 80-81.
217. Id. IT 62, 80-81.
218. Id.
219. Parks, supra note 94, at 5.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See FM 27-10, supra note 120, at ch. 5.
223. Parks, supra note 94, at 5.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 6.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER
"[Executive Order 12,333] does not limit America's ability to act
in its self-defense."
Ari Fleischer 2
26
Assassination is an unlawful killing in violation of the rule of
law. 27 Whether conducted in peacetime or wartime, assassination
is absolutely forbidden under international law even in the ab-
sence of an executive order supposedly banning the practice.228
Anyone who carried out an act of assassination would be guilty of
either murder or a war crime, depending on the circumstances. 9
Furthermore, anyone who ordered the assassination would be
guilty of either murder or a war crime under the concept of com-
mand responsibility.23 °
On the other hand, the use of force in legitimate acts of self-
defense does not qualify as assassination. 23' Those who think that
the United States is somehow restricted by Executive Order
12,333 from targeting terrorists or rogue nations that threaten to
conduct terrorist acts are mistaken.232 Nevertheless, if it is the
case that Executive Order 12,333 causes more confusion than
clarity in understanding the applicable rule of law, should it be
repealed? One commentator has argued that the "failure of the
executive order to outline exactly what it prohibits has set plan-
ners and operators adrift.' '23 3 But a stronger case can be made by
226. Benac, supra note 46.
227. See Parks, supra note 94, at 4.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. FM 27-10, supra note 120, at 501. Under the concept of indirect responsibility, a
commander can be charged with the law of war violations committed by his subordinates if
he ordered the crimes committed or knew of the crimes and did nothing to stop them. See
id. In the United States, this standard of responsibility is known as the Medina Standard.
Id.; see RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY 130-32 (1982). The United States also recognizes the so-called Yamashita
Standard where the commander is also held responsible if he should have known about
the crimes committed by his subordinates. See id. at 86.
231. See Parks, supra note 94, at 7-8.
232. Id.
233. Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 679 (1992).
[Vol. 37:751
NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ASSASSINATION
pointing out that it is the public, politicians, and commentators
that are most confused by the executive order, not the military
planners and operators. The military generally understands that
the proper application of force in self-defense does not violate Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333. Politicians and commentators seem most
susceptible to succumbing to the temptation to apply an over-
broad interpretation to the ban on assassination.234
As a practical matter, it is fundamentally obvious that no
American President will ever repeal Executive Order 12,333
unless he immediately replaced it with a better order. The result-
ing negative repercussions in the sphere of public relations alone
would render such a move remarkably insensate. The better or-
der, of course, would require a document consisting of a clear
definition of assassination circumstances where the lawful use of
force could be applied. As America continues its War on Terror, it
is vitally important to operate under clearly framed principles
under the rule of law and not shrouded ambiguities and innuen-
dos. Our enemies, as well as our friends and allies, need to under-
stand that the United States of America operates under the rule
of law. As Professor John Norton Moore aptly stated: "Law ... is
vitally important. Even in the short run, law serves as a standard
of appraisal for national actions and as a means of communicat-
ing intentions to both friend and foe, and perceptions about law-
fulness can profoundly influence both national and international
support for particular actions."23
Both clarity and respect for the rule of law demands that Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333 be repealed and replaced with a new execu-
tive order on assassination that is properly couched in the legal
parameters of self-defense. Indeed, a new executive order is far
overdue.
234. See supra Part II.B.
235. JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION 1 (1984).
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